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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant brought a Motion to Intervene and a 
Motion to Set Aside Plaintiffs' Default Judgment granted 
upon Plaintiffs' Unlawful Detainer action to obtain 
possession of their real property after having exercised 
their forfeiture rights under a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
DISPOSTION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Judge, Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor, denied Appellant's Motion to Intervene and further 
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denied Intervenor's Motion to Set Aside Plaintiffs' Default 
Judgment. Each Motion was denied without comment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant, Ronald Johnson, seeks the right to 
intervene and enter a defense to Plaintiffs' Unlawful 
Detainer action by a reversal of the Lower Court's denial of 
his Motion to Intervene and Motion to Set Aside Plaintiffs' 
Default Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiff, Sellers, under a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract in October 1978, elected to rescind said Contract 
under Paragraph 16{a), because the Buyers (assignees of the 
original Buyers) were three months delinquent in payments of 
$7 49 per month. Plaintiffs' attempted to enforce said 
rescission and forfeiture by an Unlawful Detainer action 
filed August 19, 1981. Default Judgment was granted on 
September 23, 1981. The Appellant was not named in nor had 
any notice of the commencement of said lawsuit. 
Appellant had a prior undisclosed interest in the 
concerned real property per the March 27, 1979 agreement 
with Joseph c. Franich, one of the named defendants. 
subsequently, Appellant purchased all of the Defendants•, 
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Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn M. Franich, interest (one-half 
interest) in the concerned real property by paying $5,000 
cash and giving a $5,000 Note on September 15, 1981. A 
Quitclaim Deed was recorded on September 15, 1981, 
evidencing that purchase. At no time did Defendant, Joseph 
C. Franich, indicate to the Appellant that there were any 
delinquencies or lawsuits with the concerned property, as 
per Intervenor's Affidavit. 
Appellant's interest was not known to Plaintiffs 
prior to the commencement of their lawsuit and not of record 
until the 15th day of September, 1981. 
Appellant had no notice of the delinquencies, the 
Contract termination, nor the Unlawful Detainer action until 
after September 25, 1981. Immediately after receiving 
notice, Appellant offered to bring the Contract current and 
pay all accruing court costs and attorney's fees, which the 
Plaintiffs' rejected. Appellant filed his Motions to 
intervene and set aside the Default Judgment on October 6, 
1981. 
Appellant's Motions to Intervene and to Set Aside 
the Default Judgment were denied by the District Court Judge 
at the hearing of October 14, 1981. At that hearing the 
Intervenor tendered the sum of $6,500, (alleged by Plaintiff 
attorney to be the total sum due and owing including all 
costs and attorney's fees) to reinstate the Contract. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. INTERVENOR HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE 
IN ANY LAWSUIT IN WHICH HIS INTEREST 
MAY NOT BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED OR 
THE RULING ON WHICH WILL ADVERSELY 
AFFECT THE DISPOSITION OF HIS PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, EVEN THOUGH INTERVENOR (a) 
ACQUIRES A PROPERTY RIGHT AFTER AN 
ACTION IS COMMENCED, (b) HAS AN 
UNDISCLOSED PROPERTY RIGHT WHEN THE 
ACTION IS COMMENCED, or (c) IS A 
JOINT VENTURER WITH A DEFENDANT. 
Rule 24{a) (2) and (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states as follows: 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely 
application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: ... (2) when the 
representation of the Applicant's interest by 
existing parties is or may be inadequate and 
the Applicant is or may be bound by a judgment 
in the action; or (3) when the Applicant is so 
situated as to be adversely affected by a 
distribution or other disposition of property 
which is in the custody or subject to the 
control or disposition of the court or an 
officer thereof. 
All persons claiming property rights from the named 
Defendants in Plaintiffs' lawsuit will have any property 
rights which they hold adversely affected by said judgment. 
Mr. Johnson, the Intervenor, claims rights to said property 
through the Defendants, Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn M. 
Franich, from two different transactions. First, in order 
of time but not importance, would be his contract right with 
the Defendant, Joseph C. Franich, entered into on March 27, 
1979, under which funds were placed with Mr. Franich so that 
he could invest in real property. These funds subsequently 
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became part of the downpayment Mr. Franich used to purchase 
the subject real property. By the terms of the Contract, 
the Appellant was the owner of one-half interest in the 
subject real property. Second, Appellant purchased from 
Defendants, Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn M. Franich, all of 
their right, title and interest in and to said real property 
(specifically the other one-half interest, that Johnson 
didn't already own) by paying the sum of $10,000 in the form 
of a $5,000 Cashier's check and a Promissory Note for $5,000 
on September 15, 1981. If there was any objection to the 
Intervenor having the right under Rule 24 to intervene, when 
his only property interest was an undisclosed or dormant 
partner's interest, no question as to that right can be 
raised after the September 15th purchase. 
My review of Rule 24 in Utah law and in the cases 
and treatises published on the subject, reveal no cases or 
articles in point. Commerce Block Realty Company v. United 
States Fidelity & Guarantv Company, 83 Utah 414, 28 P2d 1081 
(1934), an early Utah case sets the standard for 
intervention which has carried over to today as follows: 
The test usually applied to the right to 
intervene is whether a person seeking to 
intervene may gain or lose by a direct legal 
operation and the effect of the judgment. 
(Page 1083) 
Appellant will lose all property rights (whether 
undisclosed, joint or direct and whether acquired before or 
after the commencement of the suit), if the Plaintif~ is 
-5-
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successful. Certainly the Appellant in this case has the 
right to intervene under the Commerce Block Realty test. 
The case at hand also presents the different 
circumstance of requesting to intervene after a Default 
Judgment has been granted. This question was raised in 
Martin v. Pickering, 85 Wash.2d 241, 533 P2d 380 (1975). 
This case, although being decided against the Intervenor, 
directs us to the type of reasoning we should consider as 
follows: 
In considering the question of timeliness, 
all the circumstances should be considered, 
including the matter of prior notice of the 
lawsuit and the circumstances contributing 
to the delay in moving to intervene. (Page 382) 
The case further refers us to N.A.A.C.P. v. New York, 413 
U . S . 3 4 5 , 9 3 S . Ct • 2 5 91 , 3 7 L . Ed • 2 d 6 4 8 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; and 
Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.1953) as support 
for their reasoning. Martin v. Pickering concerns a Motion 
to Intervene after judgment. The case concludes after 
considering all the circumstances, the Intervenor's actual 
notice from the beginning of the lawsuit and, in fact, its 
earlier appearance and then withdrawal from the lawsuit, was 
not sufficient to allow intervention after judgment. 
Mr. Johnson, the Intervenor in our suit, had no 
knowledge whatsoever of the lawsuit and the subsequent 
Default Judgment, granted only some eight (8) days after the 
Intervenor's. acquisition of Defendant Franich' s remaining 
real property interest. Immediately upon discovering that 
-6-
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delinquencies existed in the afore-referred to Contract, and 
the existence of this lawsuit, requests were made to the 
Plaintiffs to reinstate and motions to join the lawsuit were 
filed. The motions were filed October 6, 1981, thirteen 
(13) days after the Default Judgment and between six (6) and 
eleven (11) days after actual notice thereof. Appellant 
could have done nothing else to preserve his rights in a 
more timely manner. Further, his actions in a timely 
manner as described above, are not injured or made faulty by 
any claimed constructive notice attributed to him as a 
result of service upon the Defendant Franich, when Johnson 
was his undisclosed partner. Regardless of constructive 
notice, his timely action, as soon as he had actual 
knowledge of the lawsuit entitles him to intervene. The 
issues surrounding constructive notice are discussed in 
detail in Point II, which also should be incorporated 
herein. The Trial Court Judge erred in failing to apply 
Rule 24(a) correctly and should be overturned by this Court. 
POINT II. SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS ALLOWABLE FOR AN 
INTERVENOR, WHO HAD NO PERSONAL KNOW-
LEDGE OF THE ACTION, TOOK TIMELY ACTION 
AFTER OBTAINING SAID PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; 
EVEN THOUGH OTHER DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE AND SOME OF THOSE DEFENDANTS 
MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATES, JOINT 
VENTURERS, OR PARTNERS OF THE INTERVENOR. 
Rule 60(b) (1), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
is and has been espoused by numerous cases to provide 
-7-
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equitable relief from a Default Judgment to any defendant 
that has proper grounds - - mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect. 
A person that fails to enter a defense to a lawsuit 
that would materially effect him, neglects his duty. 
However, if he fails to enter that appearance as a result of 
his lack of knowledge, his neglect can be classified as 
excusable. His timely action upon obtaining notice thereof,_ 
especially if within three months after the Judgment has 
been entered, would qualify him for relief under the Rule. 
Even if you contribute constructive notice to said person, 
and with said constructive notice he fails to act, he may be 
classified as being negligent. If , however, he acts 
immediately upon receiving actual notice, his action would 
certainly fall within the doctrine of excusable neglect. In 
E.J. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Companv, 14 Utah 2d 52, 
376 P2d 951 (1962) the court found excusable neglect for 
parties attempting to defend a corporation that had failed 
to answer the suit even though proper service had been made 
upon the President of the corporation. Al though the 
President had attempted to resign, he was a valid person to 
serve for process on the corporation. Therefore, service 
was proper and notice was given to the corporation and 
constructive notice to the officers, directors and 
shareholders of the corporation. However, the court felt 
that where the shareholders were attempting to reorganize 
-8-
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and moved with dispatch to set aside the Default Judgment, 
excusable neglect was found. Constructive notice did not 
invalidate their neglect. The court goes on to state: 
It is fundamental in our system of 
justice that each party to a 
controversy should be afforded an 
opportunity to present his side of 
the case. For that reason it is 
quite uniformly regarded as an abuse 
of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
Default Judgment where there is 
reasonable justification or excuse 
for the defendant's failure to appear, 
and timely application is made to set 
it aside. (Pg 952) 
All of the shareholders in the above case had constructive 
notice of the lawsuit. They were still able to set aside 
the Default Judgment and defend the action. Even assuming 
the Intervenor, Ronald Johnson, in this case had 
constructive notice by service of his partner (Defendant 
Joseph Franich), his timely action to set aside the Default 
Judgment after receiving actual notice on the 30th day of 
September, 1981, should be allowable under excusable 
neglect. 
Filing a motion to set aside the Default Judgment on 
October 6th, when notice was first actually received between 
six (6) and eleven (11) days earlier, is timely. Further, 
the Motion was filed within thirteen (13) days of granting 
the Default Judgment. Appellant had no opportunity to act. 
He was in a similar situation as the shareholders in E.J. 
Mavhew. The E.J. Mayhew reasoning should also apply to the 
question of Appellants opportunity and timely action to 
-9-
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intervene as discussed in Point I, hereof. The failure of 
the Trial Court Judge to see this is an abuse of his 
discretion under Rule 60(b) and Rule 24. If there was any 
question, the question or doubt should be decided in favor 
of setting it aside. Interstate Excavating v. Ag la 
Development, 611 P2d 369 (Ut.1980), Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P2d 1111 (1955); Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 
354, 90 Pac.897 (1907); Heathman v. Fabian Clendenin, 14 
Utah 2d 60, 377 P2d 189 (1962). An additional factor that 
needs to be considered is that because of the willingness of 
the Appellant to assume all contract obligations as well as 
his wilingness to pay all delinquencies, including costs and 
attorney fees, the Plaintiffs are in a situation where their 
rights are not injured or compromised by the setting aside 
of the Default Judgment. Plaintiffs' Contract was only two 
and one-half (2~) months delinquent, when they terminated 
it. Appellant offered to also correct other contract 
deficiencies. If, however, the Default Judgment is not set 
aside the Appellant loses valuable property rights with 
little hope of recoupment. 
The Trial Court Judge abused his discretion when he 
denied Appellant's Motion to set aside the Default Judgment. 
However, he may not have addressed this issue, feeling the 
Appellant lacked standing when he denied his Motion to 
Intervene. 
POINT III. THE HARSH REMEDY OF FORFEITURE OF A 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, ENFORCED 
BY DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN AN UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER ACTION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED 
TO STAND; WHERE AN UNINFORMED PROPERTY 
RIGHT CLAIMANT ACTS QUICKLY TO 
(a) INTERVENE, (b) SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT AND (c) CURE ALL DELINQUENCIES 
THEREIN. 
The importance of the Trial Court's decision and 
whether he abused his discretion, is re-emphasized by the 
type of lawsuit at issue - an Unlawful Detainer action to 
enforce the non judicial termination and forfeiture of a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. Intervenor's rights accrued 
both as an undisclosed joint venturer and as an after 
acquirer of Defendant's rights claimed through a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. Without actual notice to the 
Intervenor, even though done unknowing and without malice, 
the Contract had been terminated and all property rights 
returned to the Seller. In Interstate Excavating v. Agla 
Development, previously cited, the Court states as follows 
in talking about a Default Judgment: 
However, they are not favored 
in the law, especially where a 
party has timely responded with 
challenging pleadings. When that 
has been done some caution should 
be observed to see that the party 
is not taken advantage of. Speaking 
generally about such problems, it 
is to be kept in mind that access 
to the Courts =or the protection of 
rights and the settlement of disputes 
is one of the most important factors 
in the maintenance of peacable and well 
ordered society .... The uniformly acknow-
ledged policy of the law is to accord 
litigants the opportunity for a hearing 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on the merits, where that can be done 
without serious injustice to the other 
party . (Pg 3 71) 
The Court has long recognized the harshness of Default 
Judgments. The Court should recognize the greater 
harshness of default judgments, when the substance of the 
case being supported by that Default Judgment will further 
create acknowledged harsh results. This situation should be 
reviewed with the careful eye found in a trial rather than 
summarily deduced by Default Judgments. Perkins v. Spencer, 
121 Ut.468,243 P2d 446 (1952). 
CONCLUSION 
The Lower Trial Court's orders should be reversed 
and Ronald Johnson should be granted the right to intervene 
and file responsive pleadings to Plaintiffs' Unlawful 
Detainer action. The Appellant had a right to intervene, as 
an individual whose property rights were being adversely 
affected by Plaintiffs' suit. He timely filed his Motion 
for Intervention after acquiring said property rights and 
actual notice of the lawsuit. Now being a party of the 
suit, he timely filed a Motion to set aside the previously 
granted Default Judgment because he failed to have actual 
notice of the lawsuit. His lack of actual knowledge under 
the circumstances constituted excusable neglect recognizable 
by the Rules of Procedures of the State of Utah. Whereupon, 
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) 
the Appellant may openly defend and have litigated to the 
scrutiny of the Trial Court Judge the harsh remedy of 
forfeiture and Unlawful Detainer requestjl by the Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this /£...'-(fay of February, 
1982. 
HUNT 
LE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered two copies of 
the Brief of Appellant to Allen Swan of Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell, attorneys for Respond~s, 330 South Third East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this /' day of 
• 
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